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Abstract 
 
Conversation analysis (CA), as currently practiced, comprises two approaches -- 
action-oriented and meaning-oriented. I use CA treatments of ‘preference’ as a case 
in point. In current discussions of preference, the emphasis is on action, on what 
interactants do. Action is grounded in psychological mechanisms, which CA is not 
equipped to handle. So discussions of preference turn toward a more quantified notion 
of what people usually do. I argue that attempts at quantification raise problems that are 
not soluble within the confines of CA methodology. I then turn to the broadest and most 
discussed preference, the supposed preference for agreement, arguing that it is 
context sensitive in ways that produce multiple exceptions. Using a gross, 
transcontextual average, even if that were possible, would be unenlightening. I focus, 
using an extended example, on one of the exceptions, the case of accusations. I 
suggest that we drop the action- oriented approach and attend instead to meaning. 
This approach is grounded in a conception of evidence which does not rely on either 
falsification criteria or statistical measures. Its generalizations pertain not to what 
interactants normally do but to the resources they have and the methods they employ 
in producing meaning and social organization. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Conversation analysis (CA) is the study of the organization of talk-in-interaction. It 
is characterized by a set of methodological techniques and perspectives: primarily, 
recording of ‘‘natural’’ data, participant orientation, attention to detail (‘‘order at all 
points’’), sequentiality, next turn proof procedure, and deviant case analysis.1 CA, as 
it is currently practiced, comprises two general approaches, which I will refer to as 
action-oriented CA and meaning-oriented CA. In 
action-oriented CA, the objective is to specify what conversationalists do, in general 
or in specific circumstances. The focus is on the production of talk-in-interaction. 
Meaning-oriented CA concerns itself with the production/expression, potentialization,  
 
  
1  For illumination on these matters, the uninitiated reader is referred to the wide array of 
introductory essays and books, from Levenson (1983, chapter 6) and Heritage (1984, chapter 
8) to Schegloff (2007) and Sidnell and Stivers (2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and (participant) interpretation of meaning in talk-in-interaction. The distinction can be 
illustrated with an example from Sacks’ (1992:4) first transcribed lecture. Sacks is 
describing calls to an emergency psychiatric hospital: ‘‘If A says ‘This is Mr Smith may I 
help you,’ B tends to say ‘Yes, this is Mr Brown’.’’ This is an action-oriented formulation 
(note ‘‘tends to’’). A few sentences on, though, we get this: ‘‘Saying ‘This is Mr Smith may 
I help you’ thereby provides a ‘slot’ to the other wherein they properly would answer ‘Yes, 
this is Mr Brown’’’ (4). This second formulation is meaning oriented. It speaks of slots 
created and what is ‘‘properly’’ done rather than what tends to be done. It will be (part of) 
my argument in this paper that action-oriented CA ultimately involves us in issues of 
quantification, an area which is, as I will elucidate below, unreachable with CA 
methodology. I am proposing, therefore,  that the action-oriented approach is a very 
questionable part of the CA endeavor and that the attempt at empirical generalization 
be abandoned or at least limited in ways that are in accordance with the limitations of 
CA itself. These ‘‘limitations,’’ it should be emphasized, and as I will explain in section 7 
of this paper, are essential to CA as an analytic approach. I will use preference theory2 
to make my argument. Preference has been presented, primarily, in terms of action; I will 
try to reformulate it within a meaning-oriented approach. 
I begin by surveying preference theory as it is presently presented in the literature. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______ 
2  I use ‘‘preference theory’’ as a way of referring to the concepts and assertions that 
comprise the phenomenon of preference organization. 
 
 
 
1. Preferred responses 
 
In the last few years, two major expositions of preference theory in conversation 
analysis have appeared -- Schegloff (2007, chapter 5) and Pomerantz and Heritage 
(2012). (See also Sidnell, 2010, chapter 5.) Both fail to resolve what I see as 
conceptual problems with the notion of preference. Since the two expositions take 
rather different approaches, I cannot deal with both simultaneously. Schegloff’s is the 
more orthodox treatment, as well as the more detailed. I will center my critique on his 
presentation, referring to Pomerantz and Heritage when relevant and appropriate. 
Although the notion of preference has been used for various conversational 
phenomena -- the preference for self- correction (Schegloff et al., 1977), the 
preference for recognitionals in person reference (Sacks and Schegloff, 1979; 
Enfield and Stivers, 2007),3 the preference for offers over requests (Lerner, 1996; 
Schegloff, 2007) -- I will focus first, and 
primarily, on the notion of preferred response and the associated concept of 
dispreference markers. This is the preference phenomenon which has received the 
most attention and analytical elaboration. Indeed, Sidnell (2010), in his introduction to 
CA, devotes his entire chapter on preference to responses, although he mentions in 
passing that it has been applied to first pair-parts as well. Schegloff, in his chapter on 
preference, writes at some length about first pair-part preference, but, for reasons of 
organization and economy, I will not deal with this subject in my current discussion. 
Schegloff (2007:59) says that 
The key issues in the organization around ‘preference’ and ‘dispreference’ concern 
the alignment in which a second action stands to a first, and the alignment which 
recipients take up toward a first pair part by the second pair part which 
implements their response. 
The preferred response ‘‘embodies an alignment with [the project of] the first pair 
part’’ (59). However, later in his chapter, he applies the notion of preference to first 
pair parts. So, for example, offers (it is claimed) are preferred over requests. Perhaps 
the common and defining feature of preference across these two formats (i.e., 
preference as applied to first and to second pair parts) is that production of the 
preferred alternative is promoted, whereas the dispreferred alternative is avoided or 
mitigated or delayed or, at least, accounted for. 
According to preference theory, certain utterances require responses from a 
bounded set of alternatives. One alternative is the invited response (Pomerantz,  
 
______ 
3 A recognitional is a form which enables recognition of the person referred to. I have 
suggested elsewhere (Bilmes, 1988, footnote 13) that the preference for recognitionals is not a 
preference at all, but a matter of implicature. Use of a recognitional implicates that the recipient 
knows the person referred to; use of a nonrecognitional implicates the opposite. The literature 
offers many examples of nonrecognitionals being corrected to recognitionals (thus the 
preference for recognitionals), but the converse also occurs with some frequency. Here is an 
example from Sacks (1992:44): 
A:   Corliss, the g- this chick that I’m hanging around with now ((...)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1984), which  is said to be preferred. The other(s) is dispreferred. Dispreferred 
responses are preceded by delays, mitigated, and are accompanied (or constituted) 
by accounts. These practices are known as dispreference markers. If it is anticipated 
that a dispreferred response will be forthcoming, the speaker may add to the first pair-
part to encourage the production of a preferred response (Davidson, 1984) or alter the 
first pair-part in such a way as to make the anticipated response a preferred 
response. Moreover, the absence of a response is, relevantly, the 
absence of the preferred response, so the dispreferred response is implicated. 
When a preferred response is produced in association with dispreference markers, the 
response will be taken to be in some way problematic. This is the early formulation of 
preference theory, based largely on a 1973 lecture by Harvey Sacks (reprinted in Button 
and Lee, 1987), as presented in Pomerantz (1984) and many other previous and 
subsequent publications by various authors (see especially Atkinson and Drew, 1979; 
Heritage, 1984; Heritage and Watson, 1979; Levenson, 1983; Pomerantz, 1975, 1978). 
I have mentioned here some foundational writings, but preference theory is still very 
much alive as indicated not only by the summary pieces by Schegloff and by 
Pomerantz and Heritage, but by its invocation in numerous recent CA studies. 
 In fact, if anything, reliance on preference theory seems to be getting stronger and, 
in particular, wider. Stivers and Robinson (2006) treat the turn-taking rule proposed by 
Sacks et al. (1974) as a matter of preference. Pomerantz and Heritage (2012) treat a 
broad range of conversational practices in terms of preference. ‘‘The core idea of 
preference is that participants follow principles, often implicit, when they act and react in a 
variety of interactional circumstances’’ (210). (It is not clear to me whether preference is to 
be associated with all or just a subset of these principles.) Furthermore, departures tend 
to be treated as resulting from cross-cutting preferences. This makes preference 
theory a very broad system of explanation of conversational phenomena. There 
seem to be three major criteria used in these presentations: 
 
1. Regular practice -- what conversationalists ordinarily do. 
2. Attempts to achieve the preferred outcome. Speakers may, for instance, reformat 
their utterances if it appears that they are about to receive a dispreferred response. 
3. Marked formatting of dispreferred responses -- see discussion below. 
 
Note, and I will make this point repeatedly, that these criteria are all focused on 
utterance production rather than inference or other aspects of meaning production. 
We might contrast this with Levenson’s early (1983) statement that 
‘‘conversationalists are . . . caught in a web of inferences (321, footnote 16; see also 
Schegloff’s [1968] comments on conditional relevance and ‘‘naive’’ choice). 
 
 
 
 
 
2.  Preference and choice 
 
I begin with a point made forcefully by Schegloff. ‘‘It is important throughout this 
discussion of preference and dispreference to keep clearly in focus that it is a 
socio/interactional feature of sequences and of orientations to them, not a 
psychological one’’ (Schegloff, 2007:61, his emphasis). This reflects the general 
position of preference theorists.4  The point here is that the notion of preference in CA 
does not refer to the actual preferences or desires of individuals. Schegloff (2007:59) 
argues further that 
Sequences are the vehicle for getting some activity accomplished, and that 
response to the first pair part which embodies or favors furthering or the 
accomplishment of the activity is the favored---or, as we shall term it, the 
preferred second pair part. 
This seems to make preference part of what Sacks calls the ‘‘machinery’’ of 
conversation. In this sense, preference might be compared to turn taking.5 
Although preference, as it has been used in CA, refers to something other than the 
psychological states of the actors involved, it nevertheless is grounded, as is all action, 
in individual choice. For illustration, we can examine two instances of what Maynard and 
Schaeffer (1997) term requests for participation: 
 
(1) Maynard and Schaeffer (1997:38) 
1. MR:      Hello:. 
2. INT:     .hh Ah hello: I’m Greg Sanders calling from the University of 
3. Wisconsin .hh as: part of our national public opinion study? 
4. .hh a:n:d we are trying to reach people at their home telephone 
5. numbers is: this a residential number? 
6. (0.8) 
7. MR:       Uh yes it is but I’m sorry I d- I don’t have any time to (.) 
8. answer any of your questions [right now] 
9. INT:                [Oh:::       ]kay well  we’d like to 
10. try you back at another time then would that be alright? 
11. MR        That’d be fine. 
12. INT:       O::kay well thank you very much [sir    ] 
13. MR:                  [Thanks] Bye bye. 
14. INT:       Bye bye. 
 
 
  
4 From Heritage (1984:267): ‘‘these terms [preferred, dispreferred] are not intended in any 
way to refer to the private desires, or psychological proclivities of speakers. On the contrary, we 
are here dealing with highly generalized and, as we shall see, institutionalized methods of 
speaking.’’ From Atkinson and Drew (1979:59): ‘‘Thus the term ‘preference’ in this context does 
not refer to a speaker’s psychological predisposition: instead it describes the systemic features 
of the design of turns in which certain alternative but non-equivalent actions are taken, as well 
as aspects of the sequential organization of such actions.’’ 
5
 It should be noted that turn-taking practices, to some degree at least, differ by culture. E.g. Meyer, 2010; 
Mushin and Gardner, 2009; Philips,1976; Scollon and Wong-Scollon, 1990 have written about different 
organizations of the turn-taking system. Tannen (1984, 2012) should also be mentioned for her work on 
subcultural variation. Perhaps there are comparable differences in practices related to preference, as 
Pomerantz and Heritage (2012:226) suggest.
 
 
 
 
We see here that the interviewer employs a pre-request form that is recognizable 
to the recipient as such. (This is typical in the phone calls examined in their article.) 
The recipient responds, in lines 7--8, with a canonical form for rejecting requests, 
including a verbalized delay, an agreement form, and an account. Compare this to 
another call from the same paper: 
 
(2) Maynard and Schaeffer (1997:53) 
1. FR:       Hello? 
2. INT:      .h tch Uh: hello: ma’am my name is Edward Price? a:n I’m  
3. calling from the University of Wisconsin? as part of our national 
4. public opinion study? .hh uh we’re tryin to reach people: at  
5.  their home numbers (.) I[s this a residence 
ma’am? FR:         [((hang up)) 
7. (1.4) 
8.  INT:      <Don’t hang up on me.> 
 
     Maynard and Schaeffer observe that, in contrast to their earlier examples, this is an 
example of an impolite response. The dispreference markers are used to produce 
politeness, and their absence expresses impoliteness.6 
The point that I wish to make is that, on each occasion of invited response, 
recipients make a choice, a personal, motivated choice, as to whether and to what 
degree to be polite. Their preference, in a psychological sense, is the determinant 
of their manifest choice. Since dispreference markers produce politeness, their 
employment on each occasion is ultimately a result of personal psychology, that is, of 
individual choice. The fact that dispreference markers are usually deployed (if indeed 
they are) in cases of disagreement, rejection, and other uninvited responses, is a 
result of the fact that people usually choose to be polite. 
So, what conversationalists in the aggregate do is based on the choices that they 
make as individuals, and CA is not equipped to investigate what produces those 
choices. (I agree with the stance, taken by just about everyone who works in CA, that 
it is no part of the job of CA to investigate the psychology of speakers’ choices.7) Of 
course, we can still make statistical statements, if we have an adequate basis for 
quantification (more on this shortly), but, I would argue: (1) CA is not suited to 
quantification, i.e., it cannot usually produce defensible statistical results, and (2) To 
the extent that CA occupies itself with quantification and empirical generalization, it steps 
outside of its own unique methodological approach and its core concerns and into the 
realm of ‘‘normal’’ social science. But, if we are not to deal with the psychology of choice  
nor with the statistical outcomes of multiple choices, what are we to deal with? We can 
look at individual choices-in-context in terms of meanings expressed and relevancies  
 
_____ 
6 Interestingly, neither Schegloff (2007), in his chapter on preference, nor Pomerantz and 
Heritage (2012) mention the term politeness or its variants. Perhaps this is an example of the 
CA tendency to avoid terms (such as ‘‘speech act’’ and ‘‘implicature’’) that invoke other 
theoretical/ methodological  approaches. 
7  This ‘‘limitation’’ of CA, that it cannot deal with psychological matters, can be seen as 
a strong point. I have argued at length (Bilmes, 1986) on the desirability of a sociology 
which is not based in motivation, intention, or other psychological concepts. 
 
 
 
and norms invoked, how each choice affects the local organization of that particular 
episode of talk. This does, as I will discuss in section 7 of this paper, lead to 
generalization, but not to statistical  statements  (including  any  claims  regarding  
frequency)  about  what  participants  do. 
In accordance with this understanding of CA, I propose a modified perspective on 
preference: Preference retains its psychological  sense.  CA  deals  with  expressions   of  
preference,  what  we  (claim  to)  want,  or  not  want,  explicitly  or  by implication. 
Dispreference markers are not what we produce under certain circumstances, defined 
by preference theory, but means of self-expression. Dispreference markers may mean 
something like, ‘‘I would rather not say this, but, for some reason, I feel that I have to.’’ I 
emphasize that I am talking here about what speakers express, not what they may 
actually prefer. 
 
3.  Preference as action 
 
My discussion so far has been based on the notion that preference theory, as it is 
currently presented in CA, is largely about participants’ actions. In the middle (more or 
less) of his chapter on preference, Schegloff seems to take account of individual 
choice: 
there is no shortage of dispreferred responses in talk-in-interaction. Every social 
setting is a world full of diverse interests and positions and turf and stances, all 
being managed (among other ways) in talk-in-interaction, and these are not 
suppressed or dominated by the organization of preference/dispreference 
(2007:72). 
 
 
  The important point here for my present purposes is Schegloff’s focus on production of 
action. His view of preference, as the rest of his chapter bears out, is concerned with 
what participants do in conversation. A similar stress on production is to be found in 
Pomerantz and Heritage (2012). They propose that preference is constituted by a 
culturally shared set of ‘‘principles’’ of the form ‘‘If possible, do (or avoid) X.’’ So, for 
example, ‘‘If possible, minimize stated rejections of requests,’’ or ‘‘If possible, avoid or 
minimize a stated disagreement, disconfirmation, or rejection and, if possible, include 
an agreement, confirmation, acceptance or other supportive action.’’8 The definition is 
entirely in terms of production. 
 
 
  
8 ‘‘If possible,’’ it would seem, has to be taken in a non-literal sense, indicating that one course 
of action should be favored over another, other things being equal. Also, we note once again 
the avoidance of cross-referencing other approaches to discourse. Pomerantz and 
Heritage’s formulation is almost identical to Leech’s ‘‘agreement maxim’’: ‘‘(a) Minimize 
disagreement between self and other; (b) Maximize agreement between self and other’’ 
(1983:132). 
 
 
  With these two authoritative statements, I think it is safe to say that preference 
theory has been primarily about production and formatting of utterances and 
responses. Moreover, this conception of preference is basically probabilistic, 
although usually not subject to statistical analysis. This is especially evident in 
various statements by Pomerantz and Heritage (2012), such as the following: 
‘‘. . .there is considerable evidence to suggest that, in the context of yes-no 
questions, recipients generally orient to the principle of avoiding or minimizing 
disconfirmations in favor of confirmations. Questions ordinarily are designed so as 
to permit recipient confirmation, and recipients generally work to find ways of 
avoiding disconfirming responses and to build them with as many elements of 
confirmation as possible’’ (214, my emphases). 
Schegloff (2007:63) writes that ‘‘. . .with considerable regularity (although clearly not 
invariably) responses to first pair parts deliver the preferred type of second pair part.’’ 
Returning to the quotation from Schegloff with which I began this section, the issue, I 
think, is not whether dispreferred responses occur. After all, Schegloff’s discussion (and 
much of the literature on preference) is largely devoted to how such responses are 
formatted. The issue is whether preferred and dispreferred (i.e., invited and uninvited) 
responses always occur in the formats proposed by preference theory. My answer 
(and, judging from his mention of ‘‘diverse interests,’’ Schegloff’s as well) is that 
sometimes they do and sometimes they don’t. What I wish to discuss below is the 
relation of these preferred/dispreferred formats to ‘‘other interests.’’ First, however, we 
must consider the status of quantification in CA, since I have suggested that (a) the 
action-oriented approach to preference is inherently quantitative, and (b) that 
quantification is a matter with which CA is ill-equipped to deal. 
 
4.  Quantification 
 
Schegloff (1993) and Zimmerman (1993, largely following Schegloff) suggest that 
quantification may be possible in CA, but their discussions make it seem very unlikely. 
Quantitative analysis is, Schegloff (1993:102) contends, ‘‘built on the back’’ of single 
case analysis. This means that we must analyze each case separately before 
including it in a count. And the outcome of such analysis (I would add) may itself be 
equivocal. 
Suppose that we are counting answers to questions. We must first determine 
whether the prior to a candidate answer was indeed a question. This very matter is 
an issue in the following excerpt from the 1992 vice-presidential debate (Bilmes, 
1999): 
 
(3) 1992 debate (a) (Q = Quayle, G = Gore, M = moderator) 
1. Q:      ...the question is ‘n’ which you have f::ailed to  
2. address and that is why is Bill Clinton (.5) 
3. qualified to be president of the United States. 
4. hh You’ve talked abo[ut Jimmy (.) you’ve= 
5. G:         [Oh I’ll be happy to 
6. answer (that question). 
7. Q:       =talked about Jim Baker ...((deleted material)) 
8. you [haven’t told us one= 
9. G:   [I’ll be happy to answer (*) (.) May I answer  
10. 10.  (*) 
11. Q:       =[reason why Bill Clinton (.) is qualified to be= 
12. M:          [(*) (.) The question (.) was your qualifications. 
13. Q:       =president [of the United States 
11. G: [I’ll be happy- I’ll be happy [(*) 
12. Q:          [w- I- I 
13. wanna go back and make a point (.) [(*) 
14. G:                 [Well you’ve 
15. asked me a question.=Let me [(*) won’t answer my=  
16. Q:               [I (*) I have not asked  
17. you a question I’ve made a statement. 
18. G: =question I will answer yours. 
19. ((audience laughter. Q cuts in after about one 
20. second)) 
21. Q: I have not asked a question I’ve made a statement 
22. that you have not told us why Bill Clinton is 
23. qualified (.5) to be president of the United 
24. States. 
 
If we are to count answers, in contrast to, say, ‘‘mere assertions,’’ we must 
determine whether they respond to a prior utterance which is, for the participants, a 
question. As (3) demonstrates, this can be an issue, even for participants (see, in 
particular, lines 19--24). The same holds for other conversational acts, such as 
agreement with assessments. Before we can count instances of (dis)agreement, we 
must determine whether the prior to which the utterance to be counted responds is 
indeed an assessment. The nature of the prior may be (part of) what Schegloff means 
by the ‘‘environment of possible relevant occurrence’’ (1993:103), the ‘‘denominator.’’ 
The ‘‘numerator,’’ ‘‘the set of types of occurrences whose presence should count 
as events’’ (Schegloff, 1993:103), presents similar difficulties. In the case of answers 
to questions, the issue is whether a particular instance is an instance of an answer. 
Again, from the 1992 debate: 
 
 
 
(4) 1992 debate (b) 
 
1. G: ...wh:y has (.) George Bush waited 
for three: and 2.  a half years, (.) during this health 
insurance 3.  crisis, .hh before (.) finally coming out 
with a 4.  proposal (.) just before the election 
(.) and he 5.  still: hasn’t introduced it in Congress. 
Why the 6.  long wait, Dan. (2) 7. M: Mr. Vice President? (1) 
8. Q: Al, (.8) President Bush has had his 
health care 9.  reform: agenda -on: C:apital Hill for 
eight months 10
. 
 he’s had parts of it up there for 
years, .hh when 11
. 
 you talk about increasing costs the 
president has 12
. 
 had on Capital Hill (.) medical 
malpractice 13
. 
 reform legislation for several years. 
... The 14
. 
 president’s proposal deals with tax 
credits, 15
. 
 deductions, and purchasing health 
care in the 16
. 
 private sector, and making health 
care 17
. 
 affordable and available to every 
single American.   .   . 
  . 
25
. 
G: We still didn’t get an answer to the 
question of 26
. 
 why George Bush waited for three 
and a half 27
. 
 yea:rs= 
28
. 
Q: =He didn’t wait for [three and a half 
years=I did= 29
. 
G:         [during the 
national (.)= 30
. 
Q: =answer the question. 
31
. 
G: =health insurance crisis, before he 
even made a 32
. 
 proposal (.) and it still hasn’t been 
submitted to 33
. 
 Congress -in the form of legislation. 
 
 
There is no issue here regarding the ‘‘denominator’’---both Quayle and Gore 
recognize that a question has been asked. The issue here regards the ‘‘numerator’’--
-did what Quayle said in response to Gore’s question constitute (for the 
participants) an answer? Again, the same considerations apply to other sorts of 
speech action types. Before we can count occurrences of (dis)agreement, we must 
ascertain for each case that it is indeed, for the participants, an instance of (dis) 
agreement, rather than, say, a mere assertion. 
These considerations are, in themselves, enough to cast serious doubt on the 
possibility of doing quantitative generalization in CA. Schegloff also mentions the 
problem of ‘‘domain.’’ Different types of occasions (face-to-face ‘‘ordinary’’ 
conversation, interviews, telephone calls, courtroom talk, etc.) may affect the speech 
exchange systems involved in such a way that it makes no sense to generalize 
across these situations. I would extend this observation further: contexts such as 
argument may affect the way speakers construct their utterances. Thus, the claimed 
‘‘preference for agreement’’ seems to be largely reversed when the interactants are
 
 
arguing. Of course, we can just fold all these relevant contexts together and 
generalize across them, but, if we ignore the fact that there is clear variation by 
context, we have, in effect, lost the phenomenon. And, is there some finite number of 
possibly relevant contexts? If there is, how do we represent them  proportionately?  
What  proportion  of  our  sample,  for  example, should be argument? And how do 
we consistently decide, for each instance, whether it is argument or something 
else? 
Robinson (2007) recommends that conversation analysts attempting quantification 
try to minimize sampling error, but he does not say how this is to be accomplished. We 
can approach this problem by considering only very limited contexts (e.g., Clayman 
and Heritage, 2002). Or, we can solve it cleanly by considering the entire universe of 
generalization. So, for example, in two articles on the 1992 vice-presidential debate 
(Bilmes, 1999, 2001), I made various quantitative statements, but these applied only to 
what occurred in the debate itself; I was able to count every instance, so sampling 
was not an issue. When we come to the larger matters that are the usual subjects 
of CA generalization (e.g., the ‘‘preference for agreement’’), the problems of 
contextualization and sampling seem insurmountable. 
Schegloff allows that, ‘‘in some cases,’’ quantification may be impossible in principle, 
while, in most other cases, it is ‘‘premature’’ (1993:114--115). However, he also states 
that 
terminology such as occasionally or massively reports an experience or grasp of 
frequency, not a count; an account of an investigator’s sense of frequency over the 
range or a research experience, not in a specifically bounded body of data; a 
characterization of distribution fully though tacitly informed by the analytic import 
of what is being characterized  (119). 
The ‘‘preference for agreement’’ may be a case in point. But, perhaps because of 
the types of contexts that were the primary object of study, conversation analysts 
were slow to realize that the ‘‘preference’’ did not seem to hold in the context of 
argument. And this, in turn, seems to suggest that the preference for agreement 
is not a matter of how conversation works but of what interactants are engaged in 
doing. Perhaps conversationalists do, numerically speaking, tend to agree. Does this 
observation advance our understanding or does it cast a fog that obscures crucial 
distinctions? 
 
5.  Departures and exceptions 
 
5.1. Compliments and self-deprecation 
 
Very early on it was noted that compliment responses deviated from the 
preference model, insofar as that model posited a preference for agreement 
(Pomerantz, 1978). This was explained by invoking a preference against self-praise, 
cross-cutting the preference for agreement. A similar diversion occurs in response to 
self-deprecation. It is disagreement with a self-deprecation which is preferred. 
However, this preference is again reversed (or at least, as Schegloff [2007:230] argues, 
neutralized) in the English language assessments analyzed by Lazaraton (1991, 
1997), where language students offer self-denigrating assessments, which are not 
responded to with disagreement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2. Accusations 
 
Atkinson and Drew  (1979:60)  observed that  denials  in response to  accusations 
seem to be preferred, whereas confessions  are  dispreferred. 
Speakers may exhibit the dispreferred character of actions which accept self-
blame partly through their overwhelming use of the turn types which disavow 
blame ascriptions (i.e., denials, justifications, etc.) but also through their design 
of turns in which the dispreferred types occur. 
There may be two sources of discomfort in this formulation. The first is the use of a 
statistical criterion. CA has no methodology  for  sampling.  Although  Schegloff  
(1993)  argues  for  the  possibility  of  rough,  experientially  based quantification, this 
is hardly rigorous.9 However, if we grant a tendency to prefer denial, etc. over 
confession, what is the explanation for this tendency? Is it not the individual 
preferences of the actors to avoid blame?10 Can we ground the tendency in social 
rather than psychological factors? This consideration, as well as the attraction of 
grounding all preference phenomena under a single social ‘‘motive,’’ may have been 
what led Heritage (1984) to propose that denials, like other preferred responses, are the 
‘‘socially solidary,’’ ‘‘affiliative’’ alternative in that ‘‘an admission may announce a rift 
between the accused and others’’ (269). 
Heritage is, in effect, making a distinction between what is invited (confession) and 
what is affiliative (denial). But the argument that denial in response to accusation is 
socially solidary seems particularly weak. Confession can lead to apology, a highly 
solidary act, whereas denial rules out apology. Confession to a crime may result in  
 
5.3. Agreement 
 
Atkinson and Drew’s observations about the preferential formatting of denials date 
to 1979. In 1983, M.H. Goodwin published an article describing ‘‘aggravated correction 
and disagreement’’ in children’s conversation. This was contrasted with adult 
procedures for dealing with disagreement. In 1988, Bilmes suggested, as part of a 
general discussion of preference theory, that, in the context of argument,  
______ 
9 Atkinson and Drew do present a powerful argument for considering frequency of 
occurrence; namely, that it structures expectation. (I would add that it does this only it is insofar 
as it is known to the recipient.) We may design our utterances in accordance with the sort of 
responses that we expect. But, again, there are other factors which, in any particular case, 
may affect our expectations. 
 10 This actually seems to be implied in the following quotation from Atkinson and Drew     
(1979:112): ‘‘It was also mentioned that these second parts are not all equivalent, in the sense that 
some--those which avoid (deny or reduce) self-blame--are preferred on the part of the recipient, 
whilst others -- those which accept self-blame--are dispreferred’’. ‘‘Preferred on the part of the 
recipient’’ seems to invoke psychological factors. Incidentally, although I mention ‘‘avoiding 
blame’’ in the text, this is a commonsense example and not a proper part of a CA analysis. I do not 
think that CA needs to, or should, provide a motive, although it may discuss participants’ 
motivational allusions. 
 
 
 
 
reduced sentencing. Even when it is believed, denial, unlike apology, is likely to be 
viewed as self-directed, avoiding blame. Although denial may be the most common 
response to accusation, and although it may be done in a format associated in many 
other contexts with invited responses, it is confession and not denial that is invited by 
accusation. (Accusations are assertions of a sort, and assertions invite agreement.) 
This demonstrates that the formatting of a response is not necessarily correlated with its 
status as invited or uninvited, nor is it determined by which response is ‘‘affiliative.’’ 
There are other factors at play. Confession is invited and affiliative, but it is confession 
rather than denial which is frequently associated with dispreference 
markers.disagreement was frequently presented in preferred format and agreement 
in dispreferred format, and that failure to respond might be taken to implicate 
agreement (or at least lack of ability to disagree) rather than disagreement (see also 
Bilmes, 1995a, 1993, 1991). This ‘‘preference for disagreement’’ was supported by 
various other authors (e.g., Kotthoff, 1993; Gruber, 1998, 2001; Kakava, 2002) and 
now appears to be accepted widely within CA as an exception to the general 
preference for agreement.11 (Bilmes (1995b) also found that, in a Thai negotiation, 
acceptance was done in dispreferred format, whereas rejections were done in 
preferred format.) 
A recent dissertation by A.V. Drake (2013) claims that ‘‘or in turn-final placement 
relaxes the preference for  a confirming response in that both disconfirmation and 
confirmation can be produced in a preferred manner  without dispreferred turn design 
features’’ (II). 
Exceptions will, it seems likely, continue to pile up and be walled off as special 
cases, until the exceptions become so numerous that the theory, in its present form, 
is seriously undermined. 
 
5.4. Other  preferences 
 
My examples of exceptions to the preference model have all dealt with various 
manifestations of the purported preference for agreement. This is the widest ranging 
preference and the most discussed. I cannot say, at this point, whether other 
preferences, such as the supposed preference for grants of requests or acceptance 
of invitations, are similarly infirm. Perhaps they are more robust. Nevertheless, there 
will be departures, as illustrated in segment (2) above, according to variations in 
situation and personal interests and character. 
 
6.  Untangling preference 
 
I would now like now to offer a respecification of preference theory as dealing with 
the production of meaning rather than action. 
 
 
 
11  Lerner (1996), for example, states that ‘‘One common feature of all-out argument seems 
to be the structuring of disagreement within a preferred turn shape’’ (305). And Schegloff notes 
that ‘‘the activity of ‘arguing’ or ‘fighting,’ as an activity in its own right, may have its own 
preferences and dispreferences’’ (2007:73). However, see Dersley and Wootton (2000) for an 
argument that the ‘‘preference for disagreement ‘‘in contexts of disagreement has been 
overextended. 
 
 
 
 
I would suggest that preference theory properly deals with the resources and 
constraints associated with the conventional expression of personal (psychological) 
preference. Note that I am not advocating that CA deal with the psychology of choice 
-- it is the expression of preference that is at issue. Furthermore, we are dealing with the 
conventional expression of preference, as against what a hearer might suspect that the 
speaker really prefers. Preference theory, in my conception, is about meaning, its 
production and understanding. I will propose three, semi-independent aspects of 
preference: invited response, trouble markers, and first priority response. 
 
6.1. Invited response 
 
First pair parts generally ‘‘invite’’ (Pomerantz, 1984) a particular second pair part 
from a set of relevant second pair parts. Assertions invite acceptance or agreement, 
invitations invite acceptances, requests invite grants. This is their nature and their 
reason-for-being.12 Furthermore, Schegloff writes, ‘‘some preferences are grounded 
in the design of the turn embodying the first pair part’’ (2007:62). Compare ‘‘You’re going 
to do that, aren’t you?’’, with ‘‘You’re not going to do that, are you?’’ Clearly, the two 
are oriented toward opposite responses. I think, though, that there is an important 
distinction to be made between responses aligned to prior speech acts and those 
aligned to prior turn design. Specific speech acts may invite specific responses. To 
say that an utterance invites a particular response is to say that it has 
conventionally expressed a desire that the interlocutor produce that response. On the 
other hand, turn design may have more to do with expectation than invitation. 
(Consider, for instance, an utterance such as ‘‘You’re not going to help me, are 
you?’’).13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____ 
12 Schegloff does not actually refer to invited responses as such. Rather, he speaks of 
‘‘the character of the course of action, and the directionality of its trajectory toward realization 
of ‘success’’’ (2007:62--63). As far as I can make out, though, this is another way of talking about 
invited  responses. 
13  This raises the question of invented data, a subject for another paper. Meanwhile, I rely on 
the assumption that the reader finds my invention plausible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2. Response design: trouble markers 
 
Preference theory also deals with the design of responses to first pair parts that 
express preference. In terms of the formulation proposed here, whereas first pair 
parts (conventionally) express the preference or expectation of the speaker, the 
design of the second pair part expresses the supposed preference of the recipient. 
(Note that this is a very different way of talking about the matter from that of 
orthodox preference theory.) Speakers are said, first of all, to use various 
techniques to avoid dispreferred responses. This, as I have already suggested, is a 
matter of choice. Conversationalists will avoid ‘‘dispreferred’’ (e.g., impolite) 
responses when they prefer (in the psychological sense) to do so. Perhaps they 
usually do so, but that is a statistical claim, making selectivity in the collection and 
presentation of examples an issue. 
When, for whatever reason, a dispreferred response is produced, it is likely to be 
accompanied by ‘‘dispreference markers,’’ expressing reluctance to be impolite or 
unobliging. The main markers of dispreference are delays, mitigations, and accounts. I 
will be interested in particular in delays. 
Sacks (1987 [1973]) noted that disagreeing responses tend to be pushed back in the 
turn, by pauses, filled pauses (e.g., ‘‘well’’), or preliminary expressions of agreement 
(these are sometimes dealt with as mitigations rather than delays). I have, in the past, 
referred to delays, which are treated as markers of dispreference, as ‘‘reluctance 
markers’’ (Bilmes, 1988). This makes for a certain clarity as well as economy. Clarity 
because it indicates exactly what is being expressed by delay -- a reluctance to say 
whatever follows. Economy because it simplifies the usual formulation in preference 
theory. That formulation is that delays (in certain sequential positions) normally 
portend dispreferred responses. However, when they precede preferred responses, as 
they sometimes do, they suggest that the response is somehow problematic. It is 
simpler to say that delay expresses reluctance to produce whatever response 
follows, whether that response is invited or not.14 
But ‘‘reluctance’’ is too narrow. A better term might be ‘‘trouble markers,’’ because 
delays do not always indicate reluctance. Delay in responding may be due, first, to 
mechanical or environmental problems -- the respondent stutters, or has something 
caught in his15 throat, or is waiting for background noise to subside, etc. Second, the 
respondent may have a problem in understanding or processing the previous 
utterance, or perhaps has not recognized that it calls for a response. Third, the 
respondent can’t think of what to say, or requires time, say, to check his calendar. 
Fourth, the respondent knows the content of what he wants to say, but is trying to 
find the right phrasing. Fifth, the respondent has formulated his utterance but is, for 
some reason, reluctant to produce it, or at least wants to demonstrate reluctance. 
 
 
  
14  This, as well as other features of the turn-taking system, is, as already noted in footnote 
5, culturally sensitive. 
15 Since I find dual gender reference stylistically awkward, I have chosen to follow the 
convention that the general pronoun accords with the sex of the writer. 
 
 
 
 
(I have left out of this account ‘‘dramatic pauses,’’ which are not trouble markers at all.) 
Only the fifth and perhaps the fourth cases are dealt with in preference theory. If a delay 
were thought, by the original speaker, to be caused by any of the first three items listed 
above, it would not usually portend either a preferred or dispreferred response. Delays 
of the fifth type (and perhaps the fourth) are most properly referred to as ‘‘reluctance 
markers.’’ Of course, in practice, the hearer must decide what sort of delay he is 
hearing. 
Whereas we cannot always be certain what caused a delay, absence of delay is 
more readily interpretable. Heritage (1984:268) notes that ‘‘An ‘early’ or unmitigated 
[dispreferred] response can easily be heard as ‘hostile’ or ‘rude’’’. Clearly, the usual 
delay is doing something more than merely portending a dispreferred response. If 
that were the case, all we could say about an undelayed dispreferred response is that 
the respondent made it without first giving a clue that it was coming. The reason that 
the undelayed dispreferred is rude is that the respondent is signaling that he is not 
reluctant to offer such a response. This also handles the matter of denials (in 
‘‘preferred format’’) in response to accusations. The respondent simply produces a 
response without the usual trappings of politeness: he expresses no reluctance in 
contradicting the accusation. This is not surprising. Other, personal interests are 
commonly recognized to be at stake. And, of course, the prior accusation is already a 
breach of politeness. Again, it is not CA’s job to supply motives, even when, as in this 
case, they may be obvious. A general tendency toward social solidarity might be 
admissible as a principle of conversational organization, but, as I have argued, it hardly 
seems applicable in this case. Instead, it appears that other, personal considerations 
overwhelm any hypothesized tendency toward socially solidary response. 
 
6.3. First priority response 
 
What is implicated if the respondent fails to respond to an accusation? We might read 
this as failure to deny. This is not a matter of what response is invited, since confession 
is the invited response. Rather, it is a result of our judgment that the respondent would 
prefer to deny if only he could. This is a matter of judgment and interpretation, and, in 
this case at least, commonsense psychology, rather than some theoretical 
characteristic of conversational organization. 
We should note here a difference between silence and hearable delay.16  By 
‘‘hearable delay,’’ I mean that the respondent prefaces his response with ‘‘well’’ or ‘uh’’ 
or an inbreath or some other preliminary that indicates a response-to-come. Consider, 
for example, responses to non-accusatory attributions. If I make, in your presence, 
some attribution concerning your attitudes or behavior, and you do not contradict, you 
have allowed the attribution to stand, even if you have not explicitly confirmed it 
(Bilmes, 1988). Silence here implicates acceptance. On the other hand, if, upon my 
producing the attribution, you do a hearable delay, I may expect some form of 
contradiction (on the assumption that you are being polite and are reluctant to  
 
_______ 
16  The fastest and most efficient way to produce a relevant silence is to change the subject. A 
delay may consist of no talk, whereas a silence may be filled with talk, and, in a sense, consist 
of that very talk (Bilmes, 1994). 
 
 
 
contradict). 
Contradiction in response to an attribution is what I have termed a ‘‘first priority 
response.’’ I have formulated first priority response as follows: ‘‘If X is the first priority 
response, then any response other than X (including no response) implicates (when it 
does not explicitly assert) that X is not available or is not in effect, unless there is reason 
to suppose that it has been withheld’’ (Bilmes, 1993:391; see also Bilmes, 1995a, 
2012).17 Frequently (given my comments on quantification, I will refrain from saying 
‘‘normally’’), the first priority response to, say, an invitation is acceptance. If 
acceptance is absent, then we are likely to understand that the invitation is not 
accepted. This is so even though rejection is also absent. That is, it is acceptance, the 
first priority response, that is relevantly missing. Another aspect of first priority response 
relates to items arranged in series according to strength or intensity. It is generally 
understood that the strongest, most intense, or most extreme item that applies will be 
mentioned. In other words, the most extreme item gets priority mention. If, for 
example, excuses A, B, and C are progressively stronger, it is understood that one will 
offer C if one can, even though A and B may also be true. If one offers B, it will be 
understood that C is not available, that B is the best one can do. Note, though, that, 
whereas there may be various groundings for first priority response, the concept itself is 
simple: If a first priority response is not present, then it is noticeably absent and 
presumed unavailable. Conversely, if its absence will be notable, then it is the first 
priority response. 
 
6.4. Accusations reconsidered 
 
We will examine an accusation sequence from data that I collected in a Northern Thai 
village. Although various aspects of the context are culturally specific, it appears to 
me that accusation sequences work the same in Thai as they do in English. The 
setting is a rice field. Kææw, the sharecropper, and his wife, Dææng, are negotiating 
with Dii, the owner, regarding how the rice is to be divided. Also present are Muun, the 
former village headman, who moves in and out of the role of mediator (Bilmes, 1992), 
two villagers, my field assistant (a university graduate from a different village) and 
myself. Kææw is demanding more than the traditional share because Dii has 
informed him that this will be his last year as sharecropper. (Dii is planning to have 
his nephew work the fields.) I have chosen to examine this sequence because it is 
unequivocally an accusation sequence, and because I think it has certain especially 
interesting aspects. 
 
 
  
17   In the 1993 article, I explained how response priority differs from Gricean implicature. I would 
add that it is also broader than Drew’s concept of maximization, in that it applies to cases such as 
the choice between denial and confession. I went on to develop the concept in such a way as to 
comprise maximization, although I did not credit Drew, whose work on the subject (1985, 1992) 
I had not read at the time. 
 
 
 
 
 
       (5)  Rice division (a)18 
1. Dææng: You said 
2. Dii:    I (.) told you [nicely.= 
3. Dææng:        [(get rid of us) 
4. Dii:   =You didn’t listen. You really! you ran to the kamnan ((a 
5. local official)). 
6. Dææng:    Yeah, but you [said (******) 
7. Kææw:           [You told me (.) right? (.8) 
8. Dii(?):   ˚mhm˚ 
9. Kææw: What did we agree to? (.8) What did you say to me? 
10. (.8) I asked (.) what do you want me to do? (.8) I ((Dii)) want 
11.  you to work permanently  (.5) Do it until you’re bored with it. 
12. (.5) 
13. Dii:     I didn’t [say that  (.) I didn’t say that  (.8) didn’t say that. 
14. Kææw:         [As long as you’re not bored (1) as long as you’re 
15.         not bored  (.8) how can the owner take it away from you (.) 
16.         didn’t say (*) You said it in (that field). 
 
 
I will first work through some of the important elements of this exchange to clarify 
what is going on. Roughly, what we have here is accusation---denial---insistence. The 
accusation is complex, beginning in line 7 and carrying through to line 11. The length 
and complexity is produced in part by the ambiguity of Kææw’s initial question (line 7-
--‘‘You told me, right?’’). Although Kææw invites a positive response with ‘‘right’’, it is not 
clear that Dii would know how to answer, since Kææw has not yet specified what it is 
that Dii supposedly told him. (It cannot be read as referring to what Dææng says in line 
6, since it overlaps that line.) There is a .8 second pause (followed by an ambiguous 
grunt, which may or may not have been produced by Dii), and Kææw follows up with a 
second question (line 9---‘‘What did we agree to?’’). This time, it is clear that Kææw is 
asking about their agreement regarding sharecropping arrangements, but, once 
again, there is a .8 second pause, followed by yet another question (line 9---‘‘What did 
you say to me?’’) and, yet again, a .8 second pause. Kææw has made multiple, 
unsuccessful efforts to engage Dii.19 Finally, in lines 10--11, Kææw answers  his  own 
questions. (‘‘I asked (.) what do you want me to do? (.8) I ((Dii)) want you to work 
permanently (.5) Do it until you’re bored  with it.’’)  Rather than simply saying what Dii  
 
______ 
18 I use an asterisk in parenthesis to indicate about .5 s of untranscribable speech. I place 
pauses immediately after the talk which they follow, rather than putting some on a new line, as 
a way of avoiding pre-analysis. Punctuation is for clarification of meaning only and does not 
indicate intonation. (Northern Thai [Kammang] is a tonal language, and intonation, if it can be 
said to be present at all, works differently than it does in non- tonal languages.) In all other 
respects, I follow standard CA transcription conventions. See Appendix for Northern Thai 
transcription. 
19  Perhaps the provision of a second pair-part is more optional when it is clear that the 
speaker is going to answer his own question. 
 
 
 
 
supposedly said to him, he places Dii’s talk in an interactional context, as the response 
to a question that Kææw had asked. This may increase the credibility of Kææw’s claim 
by showing why Dii said what he (purportedly) did, i.e., why he spoke to that topic. 
The pause after ‘‘What do you want me to do?’’ (line 10) may be a signal that the 
next part of the utterance is an unattributed quote. It is common in villager discourse 
to use direct quotations without explicitly marking them as such (Bilmes, 2009). 
The relevant context is that Dii is ending their sharecropping arrangement, which 
means (if Kææw’s account is accurate) that Dii is breaking his promise. Breaking a 
promise is a ‘‘bad’’ thing. An accusation is an assertion that someone has done a thing 
which is known to be bad (Langendoen, 1971). Kææw’s tone of voice (including but 
not limited to loudness), supports the interpretation of his utterances as constituting 
an accusation. 
    After two .5 s pauses, in lines 11 and 12, Dii finally denies Kææw’s accusation. (line 13--
‘‘I didn’t say that (.) I didn’t say   that (.8) didn’t say that.’’) The first appropriate place for such 
a denial to occur is immediately after Kææw’s claim that Dii asked him to work 
permanently, since this constitutes the broken promise. The second is after the 
augmented accusation in line 11. His denial, although delayed, is unequivocal and 
vigorous, so the signals are mixed as to whether he finds the denial problematic. Kaew 
overlaps on the third word, the denial being projectable. His contradiction takes the 
form of insistence (through repetition) on what he just said. (lines 14--16---‘‘As long as 
you’re not bored (1) as long as you’re not   bored (.8) how can the owner take it away from 
you (.) didn’t say (*) You said it in (that field).’’) He points out that the owner said that he 
cannot take the work away from the sharecropper, which is a matter of tradition. (This is 
only partly true, since owners may terminate a sharecropper who is not doing a 
satisfactory job.) 
An accusation makes a limited number of response types conditionally relevant, and 
one of these is denial. And the occurrence of a denial supports the claim that the 
responder heard the prior utterance as an accusation. Of course, there is a possible 
circularity in that the hearing of the response as a denial may be contingent on hearing 
the prior as an accusation. Do Dii’s pauses express a reluctance to disagree? This 
seems unlikely, given that he is being accused of breaking a promise and that his 
action (terminating Kææw as sharecropper) has already been decided. If anything, the 
pauses would point to some problem in producing the denial, for example, uncertainty 
or insincerity, although this interpretation, as has been noted, is contradicted by Dii’s 
eventual delivery. Dii’s defense is, at the same time, both unequivocal and weaker 
than it could be. 
In line 16, we find ‘‘didn’t say (*)’’. This seems to signify something on the order of 
‘‘what do you mean you didn’t say that?’’ Then Kææw locates where the statement 
occurred (line 16---‘‘You said it in (that field).’’). Locating it in a particular place reinforces 
Kææw’s credibility by demonstrating (or rather claiming) a detailed memory. The 
exchange continues: 
 
 
 
 
       (6)   Rice division (b)  
  17.   ?:    (*) 
18.   Dii:    Speak [(*) 
19.  ?:   Speak   [(*) 
20. Kææw:    (*) said it there. 
21. Dii:   Don’t speak strongly. We should be embarrassed in front 
22. of him/them. ((No doubt referring to me and perhaps to my 
23. field assistant.)) 
24. Kææw:    Oh:::: (.5) If I have anything to say, I say it. 
25. Dææng:    (Let’s) discuss it further, okay? 
 
Kææw continues to insist on his version of events in line 20 (‘‘said it there.’’). Dii, 
instead of pursuing his denial picks up on another element of the talk---its tone. He 
probably attempts to begin his objection in line 18 (‘‘Speak (*)’’). In lines 21--22, 
he interrupts the flow of the talk to do a sort of metacommentary (‘‘Don’t speak 
strongly. We should be embarrassed in front of him/them.’’).20 This sort of 
commentary, it would seem, is generally available in conversation as a resource for 
diverting the topic. Dii’s move seems relevant and legitimate, but fails to reinforce his 
denial in the face of Kææw’s insistence. Kææw, in line 24, rejects Dii’s admonition 
(‘‘Oh:::: (.5) If I have anything to say, I say it.’’), but Dææng (line 25--- ( ‘‘Let’s) discuss it 
further, okay?’’) seems to take a somewhat more conciliatory stance (in relation to tone, 
not necessarily content.).  Continuing  further: 
 
       (7)  Rice division (c) 
26. Dii:   You y- you asked to work asked me at my house to work. 
27. Kææw: Of course  (.5) I asked to work your fields (.) If you 
28. didn’t agree to let me work your fields how could I do it (1) 
29. right? 
30.  Dææng: (***) 
31. Kææw: Yeah, and you even asked me at that time (.5) how 
32. much rice are you harvesting on sister Can’s fields? ((Kææw 
33. worked Can’s fields before going over to Dii.)) (.8) Getting 
34. that much you won’t have enough to eat. Did you say it or 
35. not? (1.5) [Did you say it? (.5) [Did you say those words? (2)  
36.   ?:     [(*)                 [ 
37.  ?:              [(*) 
38. Dii:   I said [(***) 
39. Muun:        [Let’s do it like this (.) [I say (*) 
40. Kææw:          [What do you mean you  
 
 
  
20 Lines 21--22 also, of course, raises some interesting issues regarding fieldwork and data 
collection, but this is not the place for that discussion. 
 
 
 
 
41.  didn’t say it? We spoke in the field, Father Dii. (.) I didn’t 
42.  forget. 
43. Dii:    Udo[m ((Dii’s niece)) (.) Udom was the one who= 
44. Kææw:   [I’m not old. 
 
In line 26, Dii presents himself as having done Kææw a favor (‘‘You y- you asked to 
work asked me at my house to work.’’). Kææw first minimizes his request to work Dii’s 
fields by portraying it as routine and necessary (lines 27--29---‘‘Of  course (.5) I asked to 
work your fields (.) If you didn’t agree to let me work your fields how could I do it (1) 
right?.’’). Then Kææw turns the tables by suggesting, in lines 31--35, that Dii invited him 
to work his fields (‘‘Yeah, and you even asked me at that time (.5) how much rice are 
you harvesting on sister Can’s fields? (.8) Getting that much you won’t have enough to 
eat. Did you say it or not? (1.5) Did you say it? (.5) Did you say those words?’’). There 
is some delicate moral positioning going on here. He finishes by once again 
challenging Dii to remember his own words. Once again, there are multiple pauses 
before Dii responds. These pauses may be contrasted with Kææw’s contradictions, 
which are largely done in overlap. Apparently, in line 38, Dii denies having 
encouraged Kææw to sharecrop his fields, at least in the way that Kææw claims (‘‘I 
said (***)’’). Most of line 38 is untranscribable, but Kææw’s lines 40--42 (‘‘What do you 
mean you didn’t  say it? We spoke in the field, Father Dii. (.) I didn’t forget.’’) seem to 
indicate the general nature of what Dii said. Muun’s attempt to intervene (line 39---‘‘Let’s 
do it like this (.) [I say (*)’’), apparently with the aim of offering some solution, is cut off by 
Kææw’s insistence on the accuracy of his description, in the course of which he, 
once again, specifies the location where Dii purportedly spoke (lines 40--42). Although 
age is respected in Thailand, Kææw uses it here (lines 42--44--- ‘‘I didn’t forget. . .I’m 
not old’’) to belittle Dii and legitimate his own version of what occurred. 
Here is the conclusion of this exchange: 
 
       (8)  Rice division (d) 
43. Dii:   Udo[m ((Dii’s niece)) (.) Udom was the one who= 
44. Kææw:   [I’m not old. 
45. Dii:    =encouraged you to come and work here. (1.5) 
46. Dææng: Right, Udom was the one who [encouraged us. 
47. Kææw:                    [Yeah [(.) Udom= 
48.   ?                       [(**) 
49. Kææw:  =encouraged (.) [us. 
50. Dææng:                   [And it’s it’s not Udom’s prop[erty. It’s= 
51. Dii:                                  [And  now= 
52. Dææng:   =[yours. 
53. Dii;       =[it- it’s like this 
54. Dææng:   If [you didn’t allow us to work, we wouldn’t be able to= 
55. Kææw:        [Yeah. 
56. Dææng:    =work. You [agreed to let us work and we already= 
57. ?:           [Actually, it was) (*) Udom (*) 
58. Dææng:    =settled it. 
59. Kææw:     I do(h)n’t kn(h)ow whose fault it (h)w(h)as hehhaha 
60. I’m not criticizing anyone hahaha.= 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dii, in lines 43--45 (‘‘Udom ((Dii’s niece)) (.) Udom was the one who encouraged you to 
come and work here.’’), admits that Kææw was encouraged to sharecrop Dii’s fields, 
but attributes this to his niece, Udom. Dææng (line 46---‘‘Right, Udom was the one 
who encouraged us.’’) agrees, but only after a 1.5 second pause. This might be read 
as reluctant agreement, especially given her continuation in lines 50--58 (‘‘And it’s it’s not 
Udom’s property. It’s yours. If you didn’t allow us to work, we wouldn’t be able to work. 
You agreed to let us work and we already settled it.’’). Kææw (lines 47--49---‘‘Yeah (.) 
Udom encouraged (.) us.’’) also accepts Dii’s attribution. In his case, this 
acceptance may be preliminary to his conciliatory stance in lines 59--60. At any rate, 
they have not abandoned their position, but, by allowing Udom into the conversation, 
they seem to have softened their tone. Then, in lines 59--60 (‘‘I do(h)n’t kn(h)ow 
whose fault it (h)w(h)as hehhaha I’m not criticizing anyone hahaha.’’), Kææw goes 
further and makes the transparently false statement (note the laugh tokens) that he is 
not criticizing anyone. The denial of anger is perhaps more common in Thailand than in 
Western cultures, since a declaration of anger is itself an angry act and may lead to 
a rupture of the relationship. 
   Thus, there are, broadly speaking, two accusations leveled against Dii: (1) He 
broke a promise, and a traditional obligation, to let Kææw sharecrop the land for as 
long as he (Kææw) was inclined to do so. (2) He encouraged Kææw to drop his 
previous arrangement with another landowner and sharecrop his (Dii’s) fields 
instead. Although Kææw is quite adamant on both points, he, in concert with 
Dææng, allows Dii to divert the blame for (2) to Dii’s niece. It is especially notable 
that, although each accusation is met with a denial by Dii, when Kææw insists on the 
validity of his accusation, Dii does not pursue his denial. Instead, in the first case, he 
comments on the tone of Kææw’s talk, and, in the second, he attributes the act in 
question to his niece. 
I played this tape for a villager, a key informant. He commented, ‘‘At least they didn’t 
reach khing and haa.’’ Khing (you) and haa (I, me) are disrespectful pronouns. Older, 
higher status villagers regularly refer to younger ones with these pronouns, but it 
would have been a major breach of etiquette for Kææw to use them with Dii. Instead, 
he refers to Dii throughout as Phøø (father) Nøøy (honorific for one who has served 
as a Buddhist novice). This preserves a veneer of politeness and the possibility that 
they will, as the villagers say, ‘‘be able to look each in the face’’ when this is over. 
Now, let us examine this exchange in terms of the three features of preference that I 
suggested earlier. First, Kææw is clearly inviting Dii to admit that he made the 
attributed promises. Such an admission would, in Schegloff’s terms, permit the 
projected trajectory of the interaction to proceed uninterrupted. Presumably, Kææw 
would have proceeded to make his case for a division of the rice that was more 
favorable to him. Instead, Kææw has to deal with Dii’s denial. It would seem very odd 
to claim that Dii’s denial was the socially solidary alternative. Solidary with whom? 
Kææw certainly doesn’t seem to find it so.  
The canonical denial should, according to preference theory, occur in preferred 
format, that is, without pause or other dispreference markers, since denials are, 
supposedly, preferred. However, Dii’s denials are preceded by multiple pauses, and 
so marked for dispreference. These pauses suggest that the eventual denial is 
somehow troubled.  Indeed, although at least the first denial is vigorously 
 
 
 
 
presented,21 it is not pursued in the face of Kææw’s immediate contradictions. The first 
denial is diverted into an admonition not to speak strongly. The second is not 
absolute; instead of claiming that the attributed action did not occur, there is a shifting 
of blame to Dii’s niece. So, we have here two species of denial --‘‘I didn’t say it (and it 
never occurred)’’ and ‘‘I didn’t say it (she said it)’’. (However, Kææw’s insistence, in 
segment (7), that Dii encouraged them is quite strong and is never explicitly withdrawn.) 
Whereas admission is the invited response, denial is the first priority response, in that 
absence of denial would be tantamount to admission. 
What actually occurs in this exchange is somewhat equivocal. Dii denies, in line 13, 
that he offered Kææw permanent tenure. In line 38, he apparently denies that he 
encouraged them to sharecrop his fields. In both cases, Kææw immediately 
contradicts. In the first case, Dii changes the subject rather than pursue his denial. In 
the second case, it is Kææw who, in part, abandons his accusation by accepting that 
Udom had encouraged them. However, Kææw does not quite withdraw his assertion 
that Dii encouraged them. And Dææng and Kææw insist on Dii’s responsibility 
regardless of who encouraged them. The first denial is particularly interesting, since 
it is marked both for strength (repetition and unequivocal wording) and for weakness 
(delay and failure to follow up). Preference theory has dealt very largely with either 
troubled or untroubled presentation, but the signals here are mixed. 
Kææw’s responses to Dii’s first denial and, initially, to his second, are not aimed 
at minimizing disagreement, as preference theory might predict. This is more the sort 
of interaction that has been found to characterize argument. Kææw would rather be 
right than polite--this at least, is what is expressed by his action. 
The exchange in segment (8), centered on Udom’s alleged role, is similarly complex. 
In this case, Dææng and Kææw produce the invited response, namely, agreement 
that Udom encouraged them to sharecrop Dii’s fields. However, their agreement is 
delayed. For Dææng, it appears, agreement is reluctant. For Kææw, it may be part of 
a conciliatory move. 
I am not concerned here with what Northern Thai speakers usually do or with their 
supposed efforts to achieve an interaction approximating the prescribed preference 
model. My point is not that accusers and deniers do things this way or that way, but 
that however they do it on any particular occasion can be examined for the 
meanings expressed. I am suggesting that we retreat from empirical generalization 
back into the indexical particulars of the situation. Does this ‘‘retreat’’ leave an 
opportunity for findings of a general nature? I believe that it does, but the findings 
concern methods of meaning production and interpretation, as discussed in section 
7. 
In summary, we can re-examine responses to accusations in terms of the three 
notions of invited response, trouble markers, and response priority. First, we note that 
confession is the invited response. Second, that denial is the first priority response; that 
is, if a denial is not forthcoming, it will be noticed as relevantly absent, with an 
implicated acknowledgment of guilt. Finally, the occurrence of reluctance markers  
  
21 Might we say that features such as vigorous and unequivocal presentation are 
‘‘preference markers’’? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
suggests that the impending response is in some sense troubled. If it is a confession, 
the source of the trouble is ordinarily obvious -- the respondent is reluctant to confess. If 
it is a denial, the sincerity or some other aspect of the denial may be brought into 
question. We must also consider, however, the tone of the denial itself. What are we 
to make of a strong but trouble-marked denial? In any case, for participants, the 
specific interpretation of trouble markers is a matter of judgment, based usually in 
commonsense psychology. I offer this way of dealing with ‘‘preference’’ as an 
alternative to saying that agreement is preferred, except in response to accusations 
or compliments or self-denigration or in the context of argument, and so forth. 
Orthodox preference theory, I would argue, is not really, or at least entirely, a theory 
of how conversation works -- it is rather a prediction of how people will behave, an 
attempt at empirical, statistical generalization. It is true that the generalizations 
made in the literature on preference are supported by numerous examples, but they  
are  selected examples and so lack statistical validity. The claim seems to be that 
preference theory (the action-oriented variety) holds for an overwhelming number of 
cases (Schegloff, 1993), but this may be, in part, an artifact of the sorts of 
conversations that have usually been analyzed. I am not sure what is gained 
analytically by statements, even accurate statements, about the statistical 
predominance of a particular sort of response or action, statements which gloss 
over the particular circumstances of production and reception. 
It is a familiar observation that initially promising theories in social science break 
down as more contexts are brought under consideration. Thus, for example, the move 
from an essentialist to a situational approach in psychology (Howard, 1982). Perhaps 
something similar is happening, or will happen, or should happen with preference 
theory.22 
 
 
 
________ 
22 This is as good a place as any to mention that this paper originally had two sections that I 
removed for structural reasons. One dealt with preference as applied to first pair parts. I noted 
that, in addition to problems already mentioned in connection with second pair part preference, 
there are three further complications. One is that our inventory of speech acts is vernacular 
and so a questionable basis for analysis, especially when we consider that different languages 
may have different lists. The second is that choices made in regard to first pair parts are 
content-sensitive. Finally, speech actions may be ambiguous; in saying that ‘‘X is preferred 
over Y,’’ we have made a useful (or at least meaningful) statement only if instances of X and 
Y can be unproblematically identified. The second deleted section dealt with what might be 
called ‘‘the preference for preference.’’ It suggests that there has been a bias toward 
interpreting certain conversational phenomena as preference-related when there are other 
available interpretations that are equally or more convincing. When you have a hammer, it is 
said, everything looks like a nail. 
 
 
 
 
 
7. The conversation analytic endeavor 
 
Here is a segment first presented by Sacks (1987:62 [1973]) and used by 
Schegloff (2007) and Pomerantz and Heritage (2012) in their discussions of 
preference. 
 
(9)     Sacks (1987) 
A: That where you live? Florida? 
B:     That’s where I was born. 
 
This is offered as an example of the preference for agreement, or the 
dispreference for disagreement.23 (Schegloff comments that it is ‘‘clear’’ that B does 
not live in Florida. Sacks says it is ‘‘obvious.’’ Neither elucidates this observation, 
which would, I suppose, lead to a discussion of implicature.) But what is the actual 
significance of this example? Surely, a disconfirming answer, such as ‘‘No, I live in 
California,’’ could occur.24 And, if it did, what would that prove? Could I use it as an 
example of a claimed preference for disagreement? In either case, we are dealing 
with selected examples. One response to this objection might be that (9) is not 
offered as evidence for the preference for agreement; rather, it is a demonstration 
of one way that such a preference is realized. But, if examples such as (9) are not 
evidence for such a preference, where is the evidence? 
I would like to argue that examples such as (9) are significant, that they, in fact, are 
proof of a sort. My argument is that the concepts of evidence and proof have a 
particular interpretation within CA. Popper (1959) suggested the falsification criterion 
for scientific laws. A scientific ‘‘law’’ is true until further notice. At any moment, an event 
may occur which stands in contradiction to the ‘‘law,’’ at which point it is no longer a law. 
There is no way to prove a scientific law to be true. All we can do is to repeatedly test it 
and fail to disconfirm it. Such a conception of scientific truth clearly has no application 
within social science, which does not deal in laws. The dominant criteria governing 
generalization in most social science have been correlation and probability. Statistical 
analysis has been the ultimate measure. (It is true that there is a great deal of 
descriptive and interpretive work in social science, but this work does not seem to offer 
any criteria to govern generalization.) CA, I would argue, does not rest on a 
probabilistic base, and its notion of evidence and proof is more or less the obverse of 
Popper’s. 
The claim that CA is not a probabilistic undertaking is rooted, on the one hand, in the 
lack of a sampling methodology and, on the other, in the nature of the CA endeavor.  
 
  
23  It is notable that in none of the presentations of this example are we given the talk that led 
to this point and that may have made B’s reply relevant aside from any predilection to agree. 
For the sake of discussion, I will put this objection aside. 
24  Once again, I use invented data and rely on a native’s sense of what is plausible. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Even the weak assertion that CA sometimes permits statistical generalization by 
virtue of overwhelming experience (Schegloff, 1993) may be undermined by 
consideration of previously unexamined or underexamined contexts. 
   The CA handling of evidence, as I have said, is more or less the obverse of Popper’s. 
Each intelligibly occurring item is, in a real sense, its own proof. It proves that this is 
one way that a certain meaning or a certain conversational sequence can be 
achieved. This is a possible member’s practice. Sacks (1992:256--257) observes that 
children commonly make room for themselves in conversation by beginning with ‘‘You 
know what?’’ But even if this were not a common practice, even if Sacks had only found 
one case, the analysis would stand. 
A ‘‘CA claim,’’ in my usage, is a claim about the resources available to 
interactants in constructing meaning and enabling or constraining conversational 
organization and conversational outcomes. CA makes statements such as, ‘‘This is a 
way to perform action X or achieve meaning Y or affect the trajectory of the 
conversation.’’ CA is about How, about method. How is a certain meaning produced? 
How is an utterance interpreted? How is conversational organization achieved and 
manipulated? Of course, it is possible to misconstrue or fail to see the significance 
of an occurrence. Falsification occurs in CA only through reinterpretation, not 
hypothesis testing. One cannot disprove a CA phenomenon by finding instances in 
which the phenomenon does not occur. 
Take the example of questions. A very strong generalization in CA is that questions 
call for answers. But sometimes questions do not receive answers. In such cases, it is 
common for the respondent to account for the failure to answer. This accords with the 
normative expectation. It sometimes happens, though, that questions are not 
answered and no account is offered. In such a ‘‘deviant’’ case, the questioner may 
repeat the question or, in some way, sanction the recipient, or at least note the 
absence of an answer. Such practices, far from negating the notion of a normative 
requirement for answers to questions, support it. However, it may also happen that a 
question does not receive an answer or an account for not answering, and that this is 
let pass without sanction or explicit notice. The fact that this may and does happen 
does not disprove the existence of normative expectations regarding questions and 
answers. Rather, the fact that sanctions do sometimes occur proves the existence of 
the norms. So, CA can generalize in terms of norms (as guides to interpretation and 
justification for action) rather than statistical statements about behavioral outcomes. 
In the case of preference, I think the appropriate move is to convert statements 
about what people usually do, statements which are subject to falsification through 
counting (if only we had a valid method for sampling), to statements about how they 
convey meaning. If we can find even one example of a meaning being intelligibly 
conveyed using a certain method, then we can say that this method (under given 
circumstances) is a way of conveying this meaning. So, when we are speaking of 
preference, a relevant question is: How do speakers express their personal 
preferences in the course of producing their conversational actions? (Again, this is a 
matter of expression, not of the speaker’s actual psychological state.) 
 
 
 
 
What we can properly say about segment (9)  is that, if one wants to implicate 
disagreement without expressing it directly, B’s response is one way to do it. Instead of 
a ‘‘preference principle’’ such as ‘‘If possible, avoid or minimize explicitly stated 
disconfirmations in favor of confirmations,’’ I would suggest, (a) if you want to be polite, 
avoid or minimize stated disconfirmations, and (b) here is a way that one can achieve 
avoidance or minimization. Or, perhaps better: if you want to avoid or minimize explicitly 
stated disagreement for whatever reason, here is a way to do it. That is, statements 
about  preference  should  be  reformulated  as  statements  about  possible  choice  and  
actions  to  achieve  that  choice. 
In this conception, CA is not about production of certain classes of utterance or 
response. It is about techniques for constructing and interpreting meaning, and 
producing and constraining conversational organization. It is about the resources 
provided to participants for the construction of such meaning and organization. These 
resources can be very particular or very broad. Take Sacks’ observation that offering 
one’s name puts pressure on the recipient to offer his own name. This practice has 
broad application but also is part of a larger conversational phenomenon -- 
reciprocity. The tendency to provide ‘‘second stories,’’ as well as various other sorts of 
seconds, is also based in reciprocity. This provides for a strategic move; if you can get 
the recipient to provide a first story of a certain type, then you have created a slot for 
your own second story. In a transcript of a phone-pal call to China from America, the 
American asks the Chinese to describe where she lives. This shows an appropriate 
interest in the other. At the same time, the American gets a slot, which she proceeds 
to use, for describing her own surroundings. To raise this as a first rather than as a 
reciprocal second could be awkward, assuming as it does that the other cares. 
In this final example, from the Linda Tripp/Monica Lewinsky tapes, Lewinsky 
brings up the subject of her own upbringing by showing an interest in Tripp’s 
upbringing and then reciprocating. 
 
(10)    Tripp/Lewinski, Tape 6 
1. Lewinsky: Wull- I mean I would just that’s just- for me: ya know  
2. that’s just how: (1.5) 
3. Tripp: I mean: [(.) I have (this) 
4. L:        [(an’) I’m sure you were raised too in a very: (.) sort of  
5. 5. honorable: (.5) [(**) 
6. T:       [I would have b- I would have probably been: (.5) 
7. [tarred= 
8.     L:   [(*) 
9. T:    =and feathered (.) if I even considered saying something like 
 
 
 
 
10. that in my house.= 
11. L: =Right (.) [(*) an’ I’m- an’ I was brought up with lies.= 
12. T:     [(look) 
13. L: =(.) all (.) the time. (.5) So tha- that was how: (.) that was 
14. how: you got along -in life -was by lying. 
 
The point of all this is to suggest that there are large and interesting generalizations 
to be made within CA, even when we eliminate attempts at statements about how 
conversationalists usually behave. CA, from my perspective, is about 
ethnomethods (Garfinkel, 1967). It is about how we construct, through practices of 
production and interpretation, a stable, comprehensible social order and a particular 
understanding of what is going on in our social lives. 
In this paper, I have attempted to codify, to some extent, my sense of what CA is as 
an analytic endeavor. My approach is not ‘‘realistic.’’ That is, I do not take the view that 
CA is whatever conversational analysts do. I take the more Platonic view that CA has a 
basic nature, that CA is essentially a way of elucidating the resources that members 
have available to them, and the constraints they face, in the production, interpretation, 
and organization of meaning. I am not proposing something new; I am merely trying to 
clarify. The concepts and methods that I am advocating are already CA concepts and 
methods. When I first encountered CA in the early 1970s, it opened for me not only a 
new way of working but a new way of understanding. It had its own, unique intellectual 
esthetic, its own vision. I am not suggesting that CA once possessed and now has lost 
some primal ‘‘purity.’’ But we can continually push toward a clearer understanding of 
the essence of the conversation analytic endeavor. In the present instance, I have 
pursued this understanding through a critique of the notion of preference, which, I 
think, has muddied the waters, drawing CA toward the probabilistic model of 
standard social science. 
 
 
  
Appendix 
 
Rice division: Kammang transcription25 
 
1.   dææng: pøø nøøy køø man: waa 
2.  dii:   køø (.) uu bøøk h khing day [dii  (lææw) løø=  
3.  dææng:         [(thøøt) 
4.  dii:   =khing bø fang: na khing (høøng) pattho (.) lon::: phæw baan 
5.  kææ baan khwææn [bn (=pun) 
6.  dææng:      [∂∂ kø pøø nøøy man [uu (******) 
7.  kææw:                                       [kø pøø nøøy waa huu  
8.  khaa luu (.) mææn køø (.8) 
9.  dii)--ºmhmº 
10. kææw:   haw toklong kan yaangday  øø  (.8) pøø nøøy uu khaa 
11. yaang day (.8) khaa kø thaam nøø (.) ca huu khaa nyia’ 
12. yaangyay (.8) huu khing nyia’ pay taløøt t∂ (.5) aw con khing 
13. kaay (5) 
14. dii: bøø [waa (.) annii bø day waa (.8) bø day waa 
    15. kææw: [mua khing ba kaay (1) mua khing ba kaay (.8) cawnaa 
16. (ca) thøøt day yaang day (.) [bø waa (*) waa nay (suan han løø) 
17. ?:            [(*)                              
18. dii:   uu [(*) 19.   
19. ?:   uu  [(*) 
20. kææw: (*) waa han 
21. dii: ca pay uu hææng aay huu p∂n 
22. kææw: ooo (.5) mii yaang day khaa uu yaang an nan a 
23. dææng: (kø khøy) uu [kan na 
24. dii:                                       [khing k- khing khøø nyia’ pay khøø nyia’ 
25. kham baan han nia 
26. kææw: næænøøn  (.5) pay thaam nyia naa (.) thaa pøø nøøy bø 
27. huu  nyia naa khaa pay nyia 
28. (dææng): (***) 
29. kææw: ∂∂ læ køø pøø nøøy waa yang thaam khaa tii an (.5) 
30. høøng (.) pii can nyang naa (.5) (aw) lok khaaw day taday 
31. (.8) day ta an khing ba pøø kin ia pøø nøøy waa ba waa (1.5) 
32.                 [waa kø (.5) [kam bot nii waa kø (2) 
33. (?):           [(*)          [ 
34. (?):          [(*) 
35. dii:   waa [(***) 
36. mu:n:       [aw ii t∂ (.) (uy) naa[n waa (*) 
37. kææw:       [bøø waa yaangday uu kan nay 
 
 
_______ 
25 
I have not included tone markers. Speakers of Kammang (Northern Thai) should be able to figure them 
out without undue trouble
3  8  .    suan naa haan pøø nøøy (.) khaa ba luum naa 
39. dii: iido[m (.) iidom pen khon cak cuung khing maa nyia’ ni (1.5) 
40. kææw: [khaa ba cay thaw naa 
41. dææng: mææn iidom pen khon [cak (cuung) 
42. kææw: [∂∂ (.) [iidom maa cak cuung (.) [nø                         
43. ?:  [(**)                                                     [ 
44. dææng:           [la 
45. man naaa man ba cay pen khøøng ii[dom a man khang pen= 
46. dii:                             [la bødiaw ni naa 
47. dææng: =khøøng ii pøø [nøøy a iaa 
48. dii:                                           [man- 
49. dii: man pen pay [ii naa 
50. dææng:   [kø thaa waa ii[pøø nøøy ba huu nyia kø=  
51. kææw:           [∂∂ 
52. dææng: =haw kø tu ng nyia’ ba day pøø nøøy [toklong huu haw= 
53. ?:                                                                       [(ca waa pay kø                                                                    
54. pen) (*) (iidom) (*) 
55. =nyia’ lææw køø thaam kan la lø: 
56. kææw: ∂∂ taa phay ba (h)hu(h)a hehhaha bø waa hahaha 
57 
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